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“As I waited I thought that there’s nothing like a confession to make 
one look mad; and that of all confessions a written one is the most 
detrimental all round.  Never confess!  Never, never!”1 
 
“Reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated.”2 
 
June 13, 2016, marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision in Miranda v. Arizona.3  Miranda is among the rare cases that has 
transcended the legal profession and become a fixture in popular culture.  Time 
Magazine ranked Miranda as the third most controversial Supreme Court case 
in U.S. history, trailing behind only Brown v. Board of Education4 and Roe v. 
Wade.5  Miranda has become a favorite subject for cartoonists of all stripes—
recurring characters include philandering husbands, recalcitrant children, and 
                                                          
+ Dean Emeritus and Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law.  Dean Emeritus Milhizer 
served as President/Acting President and Dean/Acting Dean of Ave Maria School of Law from 
2008–2014.  The author would like to thank his research assistant, Emily Dhanens, for her 
outstanding work in the preparation of this article. 
 1. JOSEPH CONRAD, CHANCE (1913), as reprinted in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF 
QUOTATIONS 240, ¶ 12 (Elizabeth Knowles ed., 6th ed., 2004). 
 2. The quotation is attributed to Mark Twain.  The actual quotation is, “The report of my 
death was an exaggeration.”  Mark Twain, NEW YORK JOURNAL, June 2, 1897, as reprinted in 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS, supra note 1, at 803, ¶ 29. 
 3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  Time’s list of the top ten most controversial cases is rounded out by 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Bush v. 
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537 (1896); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856); and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 
(1803).  See Top 10 Controversial Supreme Court Cases, TIME (Dec. 13, 2010), http://content. 
time.com/time/specials/packages/completelist/0,29569,2036448,00.html; see also Alexandra 
Silver, The Supremes: Miranda v. Arizona, TIME (Dec. 13, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/ 
specials/packages/article/0,28804,2036448_2036452_2036453,00.html (listing Miranda v. 
Arizona as the third most controversial Supreme Court case of all time). 
578 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 66:577 
mimes6—and it is common fare for movies and television shows.7  Indeed, 
Miranda may be the only criminal case to have morphed into a verb—to 
“Mirandize.”8 
The Miranda decision has likewise provoked strong reactions within the legal 
community.  Professor Henry Abraham wrote that Miranda “must rank as the 
most bitterly criticized, most contentious, and most diversely analyzed criminal 
procedure decision by the Warren Court.”9  Professor Yale Kamisar, a noted 
Miranda defender, observed Miranda is “one of the most praised, most 
maligned—and probably one of the most misunderstood—U.S.  Supreme Court 
cases in American history.”10  Professor Joseph Grano, one of Miranda’s 
harshest critics, called the opinion “exceedingly atypical.”11  Perhaps no other 
criminal justice decision by the Court has been as polarizing. 
As Miranda approaches its golden years, it has become pervasive and 
unremarkable.  At least two generations of Americans have grown up with 
Miranda and have never been exposed to any other dominant approach for 
determining the admissibility of criminal confessions.  Miranda has achieved 
almost universal acquiescence, if not approval—an inevitability that evokes 
neither praise nor criticism, but rather passive acceptance.  Like the DMV and 
the weather, Miranda has become an established fact of life because a better 
alternative is no longer imagined nor seems realistically possible. 
The present-day nonchalance toward Miranda can obscure and misportray its 
divisive and embattled past.  The truth is the Miranda decision was under 
constant and serious attack for decades.  Indeed, there once was a time when it 
                                                          
 6. A personal favorite is a cartoon depicting a flight attendant who incorporates Miranda 
warnings into a pre-flight safety briefing.  See Airline Security, Miranda Warnings. Chrsitmas 
Bomber, DANZIGER CARTOONS (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.danzigercartoons.com/cartoons/ 
february-18-2010-airline-security-miranda-warning-chrsitmas-bomber. 
 7. A recent example of a comedic treatment of the Miranda warnings can be found in the 
movie “21 Jump Street.” Eriecartel, 21 Jump Street–Channing Tatum Miranda Rights 
Scene, YOUTUBE (July 6, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T45aF1NLMyMMor. 
 8. See Definition of Mirandize, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/Mirandize (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) (defining “Mirandize” as a transitive 
verb meaning “to recite the Miranda warnings to (a person under arrest)”).  The only somewhat 
similar example that comes to mind is how Judge Robert Bork’s last name became a verb, as in “he 
was Borked.”  See Definition of Bork, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/Bork (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) (defining “Bork” as “to attack or defeat 
(a nominee or candidate for public office) unfairly through an organized campaign of harsh public 
criticism or vilification”). 
 9. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN 
THE UNITED STATES 125 (4th ed. 1982). 
 10. See Yale Kamisar, Miranda’s Reprieve, ABA J. (Jun. 23, 2006, 1:06 PM), http://www. 
abajournal.com/magazine/article/mirandas_reprieve/. 
 11. See JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 173 (1993). 
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appeared likely, even certain, that Miranda would be overruled.12  Miranda’s 
fiftieth anniversary offers an opportunity to reflect upon its controversial origins 
and circuitous journey, revisit its near demise, and contemplate its current status 
and import. 
I.  THE PRELUDE TO MIRANDA 
Before Miranda, criminal confession jurisprudence in America traced its 
origins to the English common law.13  By the 1960s, the admissibility of a 
confession turned on whether it was deemed to be involuntarily obtained; that 
is, whether a suspect’s free will was so likely to have been overborn by undue 
police pressure that any incriminating statements made by the suspect would be 
excluded from evidence.14  The courts applied a totality-of-the-circumstances 
approach, in which they considered all of the relevant facts relating to the 
questioning of the suspect, including the suspect’s traits and background, the 
conditions of the interrogation, and the actions of the police, in light of broader 
values implicated by the use of confessions to prove guilt.15  If the police were 
found to have gone too far, the confession would be declared involuntary and 
suppressed at the suspect’s trial.16 
The defense bar and many academics criticized the traditional involuntariness 
approach.  They complained that it was necessarily ad hoc and case specific, and 
thus the involuntariness approach failed to provide meaningful standards for the 
                                                          
 12. See Victor Li, 50-year Story of the Miranda Warning Has the Twists of a Cop Show, ABA 
J. (Aug. 1, 2016, 4:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/miranda_warning_ 
history/. 
 13. At common law, coerced confessions were excluded from evidence because of a fear they 
were untrustworthy.  By the eighteenth century, it was established that “a confession forced from 
the mind by flattery of hope, or the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape when it is to 
be considered as evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected.”  
Rex v. Warickshall, (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 235 (K.B.).  This was the standard of review employed 
by the Supreme Court beginning with Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (holding 
confessions must be excluded where the defendants were whipped until they agreed to confess as 
officers dictated).  Over time, the involuntariness of the confession itself became the basis for its 
exclusion, “irrespective of any attempt to measure its influence to cause a false confession.”  3 
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 825 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 
ed. 1970). 
 14. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 319–20, 323 (1959) (holding a post-indictment  
confession, obtained by police with the intent of securing a statement that could be used to convict 
the suspect, violated due process because the suspect’s will was overborne by official pressure, 
fatigue, and false sympathy); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153–54 (1944) (holding a 
confession obtained from a suspect, after 36 consecutive hours of incommunicado questioning, was 
so “inherently coercive” as to be presumptively involuntary and compelled). 
 15. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206–08 (1960) (explaining that involuntariness 
is a “convenient shorthand” for “a complex of values” relating to the constitutionality of a 
confession); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953) (“The limits in any case depend upon a 
weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the person 
confessing.”). 
 16. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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police or guidance for courts in future cases.17  Moreover, they argued that it was 
largely ineffective in protecting the constitutional rights of criminal suspects, 
especially when naive or under-educated arrestees were subjected to the 
increasingly sophisticated and psychologically-based methods of interrogation 
now used by law enforcement.18  More broadly, civil libertarians viewed the 
traditional involuntariness approach as part of a larger, unjust regime that denied 
defendants and criminal suspects the capacity to effectively exercise their 
constitutional rights.19 
If the customary approach to constitutional protections was the malady, then 
the Warren Court intended to dispense the cure.  From 1953 to 1969, Earl 
Warren presided as Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.20  Under Warren’s 
leadership, the Court aggressively tackled a wide range of controversial matters, 
announcing landmark decisions that addressed racial segregation and 
                                                          
 17. See Yale Kamisar, Gates, “Probable Cause,” “Good Faith,” and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. 
REV. 551, 570 (1984) (observing that under the traditional involuntariness test, “[a]lmost 
everything was relevant, but almost nothing was decisive”).  As one observer put it, 
Given the Court’s inability to articulate a clear and predictable definition of 
“voluntariness,” the apparent persistence of state courts in utilizing the ambiguity of the 
concept to validate confessions of doubtful constitutionality, and the resultant burden on 
its own workload, it seemed inevitable that the Court would seek “some automatic device 
by which the potential evils of incommunicado interrogation [could] be controlled.” 
Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 102–03 
(footnotes omitted). 
 18. See David L. Sterling, Police Interrogation and the Psychology of Confession, 14 J. PUB. 
L. 25, 37–39, 46 (1965) (observing that “if the American police manuals are examined, there is a 
striking similarity between their recommendations and Russian and Chinese interrogation 
techniques”); Yale Kamisar, A Dissent From the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the “New” 
Fifth Amendment and the Old “Voluntariness” Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59, 62 (1966) (contending 
that the protections afforded by the traditional involuntariness approach “were largely ‘illusory’”). 
 19. See Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1425 (1985) 
(observing that a majority of the Court viewed confessions “darkly as the product of police 
coercion”).  See generally LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 14–17 (1983) 
(describing generally the negative attitudes of civil libertarians during the 1950s and 1960s toward 
police practices and the obtaining of confessions and some initiatives intended to address this). 
 20. Earl Warren, UNITED STATES HISTORY, http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h3834.html 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2017).  Before joining the Court, Earl Warren had never been a judge, and his 
background was largely political in nature.  Id.  Early in his career, Warren was a District Attorney 
and then Attorney General of California.  Id.  He later became a three-term governor of California 
and ran unsuccessfully for vice president on the Dewey ticket in 1948.  Id.  In 1952, Warren played 
a key role in securing the Republican presidential nomination for Dwight D. Eisenhower; in return, 
Eisenhower promised Warren an appointment to the Supreme Court when a vacancy occurred.  Id.  
Warren was appointed as Chief Justice in 1953, when Chief Justice Fred Vinson unexpectedly died.  
Id.  When Eisenhower appointed Warren to the Court, he said that Warren “represents the kind of 
political, economic, and social thinking that I believe we need on the Supreme Court . . . he has a 
national name for integrity, uprightness, and courage that, again, I believe we need on the Court.”  
Id.  Years later, Eisenhower called his appointment of Warren “[t]he biggest damned-fool mistake 
I ever made.”  Id. 
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discrimination,21 voting redistricting and malapportionment,22 free speech,23 and 
the free exercise of religion.24  The Warren Court also focused on the criminal 
justice system, deciding issues relating to the basis and scope of searches and 
seizures,25 discovery,26 incorporating and applying federal constitutional 
protections at state trials,27 and criminal punishment.28 
Promoting the availability and assistance of defense counsel was of special 
importance to the Warren Court.  Beginning in 1963, the Court announced three 
                                                          
 21. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding laws prohibiting interracial 
marriages unconstitutional); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346–48  (1960) (holding that 
electoral district boundaries disenfranchised black voters); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 
(1954) (ordering the desegregation of District of Columbia public schools); Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding state laws establishing separate public schools for 
black and white students unconstitutional). 
 22. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558–59 (1964) (holding that state legislative 
districts had to be roughly equal in population, basing the decision on the principle of “one person, 
one vote”); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1964) (requiring each state to draw its U.S. 
Congressional districts so that they are approximately equal in population); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 199–200 (1962) (holding federal courts may intervene and decide redistricting issues). 
 23. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (holding that the 
government cannot punish inflammatory speech unless that speech is directed to inciting, and is 
likely to incite, imminent lawless action); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 
(1964) (establishing the actual malice standard that has to be met before press reports about public 
officials can be considered to be defamation and libel); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318–
19 (1957) (holding that the First Amendment protected radical and reactionary speech). 
 24. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963) (holding that the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment required the government demonstrate both a compelling interest 
and that the law in question is narrowly tailored before denying unemployment compensation to 
someone who was fired because her job requirements substantially conflicted with her religion). 
 25. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28–30 (1968) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated when a police officer stops a 
suspect on the street and frisks him without probable cause to arrest if the officer has a reasonable 
suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime and has a 
reasonable belief that the person “may be armed and presently dangerous”); Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding that the intrusion on justifiable 
expectations of privacy was the basis for determining whether a search under the Fourth 
Amendment had occurred). 
 26. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the withholding of 
exculpatory evidence violates due process “where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment”). 
 27. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 (1964) (holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination is a fundamental right applicable to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures are incorporated though the 
Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (holding 
that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is a fundamental right applicable to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 28. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962) (striking down a California 
law that criminalized being addicted to narcotics); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (holding 
it unconstitutional for the government to revoke the citizenship of a U.S. citizen as a punishment). 
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important decisions concerning the right to counsel.29  First, in Gideon v. 
Wainwright,30 the Court held that states are required under the Fourteenth 
Amendment31 to provide counsel to represent defendants in criminal cases who 
are unable to afford to pay for their own attorneys.32  A year later, in Escobedo 
v. Illinois,33 the Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment34 is violated when police 
question a custodial suspect who is the focus of their investigation in the absence 
of counsel if the suspect has requested counsel.35  These decisions demonstrated 
the Warren Court’s willingness to depart, even radically, from past practices to 
protect the rights of criminal suspects, and further signaled the Court’s belief 
that it still had more work to do.  The Court’s next project—the third decision in 
the trilogy of major right-to-counsel cases—would address the expansion of the 
Fifth Amendment36 protections.  Miranda would become the vehicle to 
accomplish this objective.37 
II.  THE MIRANDA DECISION 
In the early morning hours of March 3, 1963, Ernesto Miranda abducted, 
raped, and robbed a young woman as she walked toward her home in Phoenix, 
                                                          
 29. The Warren Court issued several other notable decisions relating to the right to counsel, 
including Malloy, 378 U.S. at 9 (holding the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination is a fundamental right applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment); 
and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204–05 (1964) (holding that the government may not 
deliberately elicit statements from a person under indictment in the absence of counsel). 
 30. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 32. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343. 
 33. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 35. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490–91.  Perhaps Escabedo’s most enduring significance is that it 
foreshadowed Miranda insofar as it reflected the Warren Court’s negative attitudes regarding police 
interrogations and confessions thereby obtained to prove guilt.  See Joseph D. Grano, Selling the 
Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator and Modern Confessions Law, 84 MICH. L. 
REV. 662, 666 (1986) (reviewing FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND 
CONFESSIONS (3d ed. 1986)). 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 37. Some commentators have speculated that the Miranda rights warning and waiver 
protocols were not the ultimate objective of the Warren Court.  Rather, the Court was moving 
toward an end game in which custodial interrogation would be permitted only in the presence of a 
lawyer.  See OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 205 
(1973).  They speculate that the Court approached its ultimate objective incrementally, going as far 
as it could as fast as it could at the time.  See Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal 
Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 12 (1995) [hereinafter Kamisar I] 
(contending that critics who complain that Miranda did not go far enough “do not seem to 
appreciate the fact that in 1966 the Court was barely able to go as far as it did”).  As a result of the 
firestorm that followed the Miranda decision, coupled with later changes in the Court’s 
membership, the final objective of requiring the presence of counsel at all times during custodial 
interrogation, if it was ever actually intended by the Warren Court, was never realized. 
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Arizona.38  A few days later, Miranda was arrested by police and, without the 
assistance of counsel, was placed in a lineup and interrogated.39  After a short 
while, Miranda confessed to these and other, unrelated crimes.40  It was not until 
after Miranda made his confession that he was first advised of his rights, 
including his Fifth Amendment right to counsel.41  Miranda’s confession was 
later admitted at his trial over his objection, and he was convicted.42  Miranda 
appealed the admissibility of his confession to no avail in the lower courts,43 
and, losing there, sought certiorari in the Supreme Court.44 
At about the same time, the Warren Court was actively looking to grant 
certiorari in confession cases as a means for further expanding a criminal 
suspect’s right to counsel.45  The Court eventually settled on Miranda’s case and 
three others, in part because the facts of those four cases seemed less 
inflammatory than those in many of the other suitable cases, which often 
involved brutal murders or child victims.46 
Miranda’s attorneys, John Flynn and John Frank, argued over whether to 
focus primarily on an alleged denial of their client’s Fifth Amendment or Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.47  Accordingly, the lawyers hedged their bets and 
prepared to argue both theories.48  At oral argument, Flynn took his cue from the 
Justices’ questioning and concentrated on a Fifth Amendment theory for 
reversal.49 
Ultimately, in a 5–4 vote, Warren announced the Court’s decision in Miranda 
v. Arizona.50  The Court held that statements stemming from custodial 
interrogation cannot be admitted at trial unless the prosecution demonstrates the 
use of safeguards securing the privilege against self-incrimination.51  The Court 
                                                          
 38. See BAKER, supra note 19, at 3–5. 
 39. Id. at 12–13. 
 40. Id. at 13. 
 41. Id. at 13–14.  An investigating detective later explained that Miranda “was not 
unknowledgeable about his rights.  He was an ex-convict . . . and had been through the routine 
before.”  Id. at 13. 
 42. Id. at 22–23. 
 43. Id. at 24–25, 49. 
 44. Id. at 60. 
 45. Id. at 100–02. 
 46. Id. at 103–06. 
 47. Id. at 72. 
 48. Id. at 72, 82, 132, 136. 
 49. Id. at 137–38. 
 50. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Joining Warren in the majority were Justices Black, Douglas, 
Brennan and the most recent addition to the Court, Justice Abe Fortas.  See Facts and Case 
Summary–Miranda v. Arizona, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/ 
educational-activities/facts-and-case-summary-miranda-v-arizona (last visited Feb. 17, 2017); Abe 
Fortas Biography, BIOGRAPHY (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.biography.com/people/abe-fortas-
9299311 (noting that Justice Fortas was appointed to the court in 1965). 
 51. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492–93. 
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directed that in the absence of other safeguards, custodial interrogation is not 
permitted unless police first give the suspect four specified warnings,52 and then 
obtain from the suspect a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of these 
rights.53 
In the majority’s view, Miranda accomplished several important objectives.54  
It afforded Fifth Amendment protections to criminal suspects at the pretrial 
stage.55  It ensured that a suspect’s waiver of Fifth Amendment rights would be 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.56  It assisted suspects in avoiding 
incommunicado interrogations by police, and it helped them deal with modern 
psychological ploys used by law enforcement to obtain confessions.57  It 
recognized that compulsion was an inevitable attribute of custodial interrogation 
and that rights warnings were needed to address this compulsion.58  And, it 
established bright-line standards that could be comprehensively and consistently 
                                                          
 52. Id. at 478–79 (“He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain 
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the 
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior 
to any questioning if he so desires.”). 
 53. Id. at 444 (“The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is 
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”).  The Miranda decision gave birth to the cottage 
industry of producing rights warning cards and their widespread use by police and others who 
administer Miranda rights.  See BAKER, supra note 19, at 177–78.  It is little known that during his 
hiatus from serving prison terms, Ernesto Miranda would sell autographed rights warning cards 
outside the Phoenix courthouse for a nominal sum.  See LIZ SONNEBORN, MIRANDA V. ARIZONA: 
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED (SUPREME COURT CASES THROUGH PRIMARY SOURCES) 53 (2003). 
 54. The traditional involuntariness test has retained viability after Miranda, and it continues 
to serve as an alternate, if less often used, basis for suppressing confessions.  See, e.g., Colorado v. 
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (applying the traditional involuntariness approach under the 
Due Process Clause to a post-Miranda case). 
 55. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (“Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect 
persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from 
being compelled to incriminate themselves.”). 
 56. See id. at 479 (“After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, 
the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights . . . . But unless and until such 
warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result 
of interrogation can be used against him.”). 
 57. See id. at 457–58 (arguing that safeguards are necessary during incommunicado 
interrogations because, during those interrogations, police officers place suspects in an unfamiliar 
and menacing environment to compel suspects to self-incriminate). 
 58. See id.; see also Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the 
Good Old Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 735 (1987) (observing that Miranda 
found “that compulsion inheres in custodial interrogation to such an extent that any confession, in 
any case of custodial interrogation, is compelled”); Eugene R. Milhizer, Rethinking Police 
Interrogation: Encouraging Reliable Confessions While Respecting Suspects’ Dignity, 41 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 1, 15 (2006) (explaining that Miranda’s rationale is based on a syllogism that includes the 
premise that informal compulsion actually, or at least presumptively, exists in any and every form 
of custodial interrogation). 
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applied by police and enforced by the courts.  Civil libertarians applauded the 
Warren Court for its Miranda decision.59 
The Court left open the possibility that Congress and the States could develop 
alternatives to the Miranda warnings when it explained, 
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for 
protecting the privilege which might be devised by Congress or the 
States in the exercise of their creative rule-making capacities.  
Therefore, we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires 
adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of 
the interrogation process as it is presently conducted.  Our decision in 
no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will handicap sound 
efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect.  We encourage 
Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for 
increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual 
while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.  
However, unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as 
effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in 
assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following 
safeguards must be observed.60 
Given all of the Court’s ambitious objectives, however, it seems clear that the 
above-quoted language was not an invitation for Congress or the States to 
replace the Miranda warnings with a recycled variation of the traditional 
involuntariness test.  Although such an approach might be adequate to ensure 
that a confession was actually voluntary, it would remain vulnerable to the same 
criticisms that were leveled against the traditional involuntariness test that 
Miranda was meant to replace.  More importantly, this approach would fail to 
demonstrate in a systematic and consistent fashion that suspects were effectively 
apprised of, and properly waived, their Fifth Amendment rights before being 
subjected to custodial interrogation.  Any acceptable alternative to the Miranda 
warnings would seemingly have to satisfy these prerequisites.  Accordingly, 
permitted alternatives might include requiring an attorney be present anytime a 
suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation or making a video record of the 
rights warning and waiver.61  They might even involve enhancing the rights 
warning itself with advisements about the offense of which the suspect is 
                                                          
 59. See Richard Carelli, Court Upholds Miranda: Police Must Read Rights to Suspects, 
ATHENS BANNER-HERALD (June 27, 2000) http://onlineathens.com/stories/062700/new_ 
0627000005.shtml#.WH1e687543Q (“Steven Shapiro of the American Civil Liberties Union 
praised the [C]ourt for upholding the Miranda ruling, which he called ‘an emblem of fairness.’”); 
see also BAKER, supra note 19, at 61–63 (reporting that Robert J. Corcoran, an American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) volunteer at the organization’s Phoenix office, represented Miranda at the 
U.S. Supreme Court, and the ACLU covered out-of-pocket expenses for Miranda’s attorneys). 
 60. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (emphasis added). 
 61. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 
478, 487–88 (1964); Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 266, 268–69 (1996). 
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accused62 or collateral consequences of making a statement, such as deportation 
and the loss of a security clearance.63  On the other hand, the clear import of the 
above-quoted passage was that any attempt merely to return to the pre-Miranda 
status quo would be summarily rejected. 
Two additional points about the Miranda decision deserve special emphasis.  
First, the Court unmistakably characterized the Miranda warnings requirement 
to be of constitutional dimension rather than being merely a court-made rule.64  
To this end, near the beginning of the Miranda opinion, Warren wrote about the 
need “for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege 
under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to 
incriminate himself.”65  Warren continued that the Court granted certiorari in 
Miranda “in order further to explore some facets of the problems, thus exposed, 
of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, 
and to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and 
courts to follow.”66  Later in the opinion, Warren noted that although “Congress 
and the States [were] free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege, so 
long as they [were] fully as effective as” the Miranda warnings, “the issues 
presented [were] of constitutional dimensions and must be determined by the 
courts.”67  Warren then explained: 
As courts have been presented with the need to enforce constitutional 
rights, they have found means of doing so.  That was our responsibility 
when Escobedo was before us and it is our responsibility today.  
Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no 
rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.68 
Perhaps most telling is that when the Court turned to the custodial interrogation 
of Ernesto Miranda, it “concluded that statements were obtained from the 
defendant under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for 
protection of the privilege.”69 
                                                          
 62. See 10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (2012) (also known as Article 31(b) of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, which provides that “[n]o person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request 
any statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing him of 
the nature of the accusation”). 
 63. Scott W. Howe, Moving Beyond Miranda: Concessions for Confessions, 110 NW. U. L. 
REV. 905, 916 (2016); Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel 
and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 699–700 n.16 (2002). 
 64. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490–91. 
 65. See id. at 439. 
 66. Id. at 441–42. 
 67. Id. at 490 (alteration in original). 
 68. Id. at 490–91 (alteration in original). 
 69. Id. at 491 (emphasis added); see also Yale Kamisar, Foreword, From Miranda to § 3501 
to Dickerson to . . ., 99 MICH. L. REV. 879, 883 (2001) [hereinafter Kamisar II] (“I venture to say 
that at the time the Miranda opinion was handed down almost everyone who read it (including the 
dissenting Justices) understood that it was a constitutional decision—an interpretation of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”) (alteration in original). 
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The Warren Court reiterated in subsequent cases that the Miranda 
requirements were derived from the Fifth Amendment rather than the Court’s 
own rule-making authority.  In Mathis v. United States,70 the Court reminded us 
that “[its] opinion [in Miranda] stated at some length the constitutional reasons 
why one in custody who is interrogated by officers about matters that might tend 
to incriminate him is entitled to be warned.”71  In Orozco v. Texas,72 the Court 
excluded a confession because the use of an admission “obtained in the absence 
of the required warnings was a flat violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment as construed in Miranda.”73  A fair reading of Miranda, 
Mathis, and Orozco leaves little doubt that the Miranda warnings requirements 
were constitutional in character, at least in the minds of the Justices who joined 
in the Miranda majority opinion.74 
Second, the Court signaled that it would be strongly disinclined to recognize 
exceptions and limitations to its newly minted Miranda rights warnings 
requirement.  In particular, Warren explicitly anticipated and ruled out the 
possibility of an impeachment exception to the Miranda warnings when he 
cautioned, 
The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from 
being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner . . . . 
[S]tatements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are 
often used to impeach his testimony at trial . . . . These statements are 
incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be 
used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any 
other statement.75 
Further, even assuming the Court would allow for the possibility of some 
exceptions or limitations to the Miranda requirements, they would have to be 
supported by an especially compelling showing and would be only sparingly 
recognized because the warnings themselves were constitutionally based.  A 
lesser basis would not justify departing from Miranda’s dictates because it 
would be insufficient to justify the denial of constitutional protections.76  By any 
measure, the Court intended, through Miranda, to break from tradition and 
                                                          
 70. 391 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 71. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
 72. 394 U.S. 324 (1969). 
 73. Id. at 326. 
 74. Professor Yale Kamisar argues that Justice White, a stern Miranda dissenter, likewise 
understood that Miranda was a constitutional decision as reflected by remarks he made after the 
decision had been announced.  See Kamisar II, supra note 69, at 883–84 (quoting remarks made by 
Justice White after Miranda had been decided). 
 75. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476–77 (1966). 
 76. See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 223 (1981) (observing that practical 
problems cannot outweigh the constitutional requirement for a search warrant). 
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mandate new and comprehensive police practices that would surely disrupt the 
status quo.77 
III.  THE REACTION TO MIRANDA 
The overwhelming public reaction to Miranda was loud, swift, and highly 
critical.  For example, Jacob Fuchsberg, a former president of the American Trial 
Lawyers Association, feared that “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision in [Miranda] 
virtually put[] an end to the effective use of confessions.”78  Professor Fred Inbau 
shared “a concern on the part of law enforcement officers—and an 
understandable concern—that whatever they [said] to a suspect by way of 
Miranda requirements might later be considered inadequate by a judge or 
appellate court.”79  Professor Ed Quevedo recalled that the Miranda decision 
seemed to mark “the end of the world as we know it if you were reading the 
papers. . . . People thought it would lead to lawlessness, police would be 
handcuffed; we wouldn’t be able to investigate crimes, we couldn’t punish 
perpetrators.”80 
Public attitudes toward Miranda are vividly reflected in polling data.  “[A] 
Harris poll conducted a few months after the [Miranda] opinion found that 57 
percent of respondents thought it ‘wrong,’ with only 30 percent calling it 
‘right.’”81  A 1968 Gallup Poll taken shortly after Miranda revealed that sixty-
three percent of the public felt that courts were too soft on criminals.82  These 
results stood in stark contrast to a Gallup Poll that preceded Miranda, which 
indicated that only fourty-eight percent of the public believed that courts had 
been too lenient.83  The anti-Miranda sentiments were further bolstered by crime 
statistics, which purportedly indicated that in the years immediately preceding 
Miranda, the population of the United States had grown about ten percent while 
                                                          
 77. See Fred E. Inbau, Over-Reaction—The Mischief of Miranda v. Arizona, 89 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1449, 1460 (1999) (noting that before Miranda was decided, “the highest courts of 
over thirty states, and one federal circuit court of appeals, had held that there was no constitutional 
requirement that criminal suspects be warned of their self-incrimination privilege prior to police 
interrogation”) (footnotes omitted). 
 78. Miranda Decision Said to End the Effective Use of Confessions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 
1966), http://76307797.weebly.com/public-reaction.html.  In his dissenting opinion in Miranda, 
Justice Harlan warned, “the Court [was] taking a real risk with society’s welfare in imposing its 
new regime on the country.”  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 79. Inbau, supra note 77, at 1451 (alteration in original). 
 80. Miranda v. Arizona: Rebalancing Rights and Responsibilities, WEEBLY, http://76307797. 
weebly.com/public-reaction.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2017). 
 81. Bruce Peabody, Fifty Years Later, the Miranda Decision Hasn’t Accomplished What the 
Supreme Court Intended, WASH. POST (June 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/13/your-miranda-rights-are-50-years-old-today-heres-how-that-
decision-has-aged/?wpisrc=nl_politics&wpmm=1. 
 82. See Kenneth C. Stephan, Comment, Title II of the Omnibus Crime Bill: A Study of the 
Interaction of Law and Politics, 48 NEB. L. REV. 193, 217 (1968) (citing Fred P. Graham, Congress 
Tries to Curb the Court, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 1968, § E, at 12). 
 83. Id. 
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crime had risen a staggering 88 percent.84  Against this backdrop, the Warren 
Court was cast by many as being lax on crime, solicitous of criminals, and 
disinterested in victims.85  More to the point, the Court’s Miranda decision was 
blamed for promoting lawlessness, hamstringing police, and reducing the 
number of confessions obtained while increasing the likelihood of acquitting the 
guilty.86 
The force of the public opposition to Miranda was matched by the tenor of 
the dissenting Justices’ rhetoric.  For example, Justice White, a Miranda 
dissenter, complained that “[t]he obvious underpinning of the Court’s decision 
[was] a deep-seated distrust of all confessions.”87  White explained that “the not 
so subtle overtone of the opinion [is] that it is inherently wrong for the police to 
gather evidence from the accused himself.”88  He contended that the Court’s 
holding had “no significant support in the history of the privilege or in the 
language the Fifth Amendment.”89  White concluded that there was, 
every reason to believe that a good many criminal defendants who 
otherwise would have been convicted on what this Court has 
previously thought to be the most satisfactory kind of evidence will 
now under this new version of the Fifth Amendment, either not be 
tried at all or will be acquitted if the State’s evidence, minus the 
confession, is put to the test of litigation.90 
Justice Harlan, who also dissented in Miranda, argued that the requirement 
for Miranda warnings was unnecessary because “the Due Process Clauses [of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments] provide an adequate tool for coping with 
confessions.”91  Harlan warned that “the thrust of the new [Miranda] rules [was] 
to negate all pressures, to reinforce the nervous or ignorant suspect, and 
ultimately to discourage any confession at all.”92 
                                                          
 84. See Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress “Overrule” Miranda?, 85 CORNELL  L. REV. 883, 
899 (2000) [hereinafter Kamisar III] (citing Toward Freedom from Fear, a position paper on crime 
by presidential candidate Richard Nixon, dated May 8, 1968, and set forth at 114 CONG. REC. 
12,936–39 (1968)). 
 85. See id. at 894–95.  Emblematic of this is a prominent cartoon depicting a driver, labeled 
“The Criminal,” speeding away in a car, labeled “Our Criminal Justice System,” from a jilted 
hitchhiker, labeled “The Victim.”  Charles Brooks, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, http://www.historytunes. 
com/images/cartoons/46-1.png (last visited Feb. 17, 2017). 
 86. See Kamisar III, supra note 84, at 894–95 (noting that newspapers and legislators across 
the country accused the Warren Court of “‘coddling criminals,’ ‘handcuffing police,’ and otherwise 
undermining ‘law and order’”); see also Stephan, supra note 82, at 217–18 (observing that although 
it is a non-sequitur in the classic sense, it was politically effective to blame the Court for increasing 
crime rates). 
 87. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 537 (White, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting) (alteration in original). 
 89. Id. at 526 (White, J., dissenting). 
 90. Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original). 
 92. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original). 
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It was against this backdrop that Richard Nixon ran as the Republican 
nominee for President in 1968.  According to historian Rick Perlstein, “Nixon 
reestablished himself as a figure of destiny by speaking to people’s craving for 
order.”93  Targeting the Warren Court and its Miranda decision, Nixon tapped 
into public anger and fear by making “law and order” a central platform in his 
run for the White House.94  Liva Baker, who wrote perhaps the defining book 
about the Miranda case and its relation to politics and crime, explained that 
“[t]he centerpiece of [Nixon’s] law and order campaign . . . was the American 
judiciary and in particular the [J]ustices of the United States Supreme Court.”95  
During his acceptance speech for his party’s nomination for president at the 
Republican National Convention, Nixon promised voters, “[w]e shall re-
establish freedom from fear in America so that America can take the lead in re-
establishing freedom from fear in the world.”96  Nixon continued, 
And tonight, it is time for some honest talk about the problem of order 
in the United States.  Let us always respect, as I do, our courts and 
those who serve on them.  But let us also recognize that some of our 
courts in their decisions have gone too far in weakening the peace 
forces as against the criminal forces in this country and we must act to 
restore that balance.97 
Candidate Nixon later took aim at Miranda by name in a position paper on 
crime entitled Toward Freedom from Fear.98  In the paper, Nixon urged 
Congress to pass a bill that would overturn Escobedo and Miranda and restore 
the voluntariness test in order to “redress the imbalance” caused by these 
decisions and respond to the harm suffered by “the peace forces in our society.”99  
Nixon argued that “[a]mong the contributing factors to [a sharp increase in street 
crime] are the decisions of a majority of one of the United States Supreme 
Court.”100  He contended, 
The Miranda and Escobedo decisions of the high court have had the 
effect of seriously ham stringing the peace forces in our society and 
strengthening the criminal forces. 
. . . . 
                                                          
 93. Stephen Smith & Kate Ellis, Richard Nixon—Campaign ‘68, AMERICAN PUBLIC MEDIA, 
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/campaign68/b1.html (last visited Feb. 17, 
2017). 
 94. Id. 
 95. BAKER, supra note 19, at 245 (alteration in original). 
 96. Richard Nixon, Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican 
National Convention in Miami Beach, Florida, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 8, 
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 97. Id. 
 98. See 114 CONG. REC. 12,936–39 (1968). 
 99. Id. at 12,937. 
 100. Id. 
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From the point of view of the peace forces, the cumulative [effect of] 
these decisions has been to very nearly rule out the “confession” as an 
effective and major tool in prosecution and law enforcement. 
. . . . 
From the point of view of the criminal forces, the cumulative impact 
of these decisions has been to set free patently guilty individuals on 
the basis of legal technicalities. 
. . . . 
The tragic lesson of guilty men walking free from hundreds of 
courtrooms across the country has not been lost on the criminal 
community.101 
To help accomplish his objective of restoring law and order and correcting the 
extravagances of the Warren Court, Nixon pledged to appoint strict 
constructionists to the Court if he was elected President.102  With regard to 
judicial appointments, Nixon explained in his position paper, “I think [the 
Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions] point up a genuine need—a need 
for future Presidents to include in their appointments to the United States 
Supreme Court men who are thoroughly experienced and versed in the criminal 
laws of the land.”103 
Nixon’s law and order message resonated with voters.  He carried 32 states 
and garnered more than 300 electoral votes in the three-way 1968 presidential 
election.104  When Chief Justice Warren retired from the Court in 1969,105 Nixon 
had the opportunity to make good on his campaign promises and satisfy 
Miranda’s many opponents, including those who were involved in a rather 
spirited movement to impeach Warren because of Miranda and other decisions 
rendered by the Court under his leadership.106 
                                                          
 101. Id. (alteration in original). 
 102. Richard Nixon Biography, BIOGRAPHY (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.biography.com/ 
people/richard-nixon-9424076#synopsis. 
 103. 114 CONG. REC. 12,938 (1968). 
 104. See John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Election of 1968, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 
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 105. When Warren announced his retirement in June 1968, Johnson nominated Associate 
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Nixon found his ideal candidate for Chief Justice in Warren Burger, who was 
himself an outspoken critic of Miranda.  Before his appointment to the Supreme 
Court, Burger was a frequent lecturer at law schools and bar associations, where 
he routinely criticized exclusionary rules in general and Miranda in particular.  
In a now famous commencement speech delivered at Ripon College in 1967, 
Burger said, 
[Other countries] do not consider it necessary to use a device like our 
Fifth Amendment, under which an accused person may not be required 
to testify.  They go swiftly, efficiently and directly to the question of 
whether the accused is guilty.  No nation on earth goes to such lengths 
or takes such pains to provide safeguards as we do, once an accused 
person is called before the bar of justice and until his case is 
completed.107 
Burger’s approach to criminal justice, and in particular his objections to 
Miranda and exclusionary rules, found favor with presidential candidate Nixon. 
[I]n August 1967, Nixon had read in U.S. News & World Report 
excerpts from Warren Burger’s commencement speech given at Ripon 
College in Ripon, Wisconsin.  He had been impressed with what 
Burger said about the administration of American criminal justice.  
His adaptation of the jurist’s ideas to his own speeches for the 1968 
presidential campaign held significance, of course, for the immediate 
future; it was also the beginning of a deeper association between the 
two men . . . .108 
President Nixon was inaugurated the thirty-seventh President of the United 
States on January 20, 1969.109  In March of that year, Burger, serving on the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, wrote a stinging 
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dissent in Frazier v. United States.110  In Frazier, the majority of a three-judge 
panel of the D.C. Circuit, citing Miranda, returned the case to the district court 
below to determine unanswered questions about the voluntariness of the 
defendant’s confession.111  Burger vehemently disagreed, complaining that, 
[t]he seeming anxiety of judges to protect every accused person from 
every consequence of his voluntary utterances is giving rise to myriad 
rules, sub-rules, variations and exceptions which even the most alert 
and sophisticated lawyers and judges are taxed to follow.  Each time 
judges add nuances to these “rules” we make it less likely that any 
police officer will be able to follow the guidelines we lay down.  We 
are approaching the predicament of the centipede on the flypaper—
each time one leg is placed to give support for relief of a leg already 
“stuck,” another becomes captive and soon all are securely 
immobilized.  Like the hapless centipede on the flypaper, our efforts 
to extricate ourselves from this self-imposed dilemma will, if we keep 
it up, soon have all of us immobilized.  We are well on our way to 
forbidding any utterance of an accused to be used against him unless 
it is made in open court.  Guilt or innocence becomes irrelevant in the 
criminal trial as we flounder in a morass of artificial rules poorly 
conceived and often impossible of application.112 
The Frazier decision, as Liva Baker noted, “was reported in the local press, 
which was received in quantity at the White House and in which attention was 
focused not on the details of either the case or the decision but on Judge Burger’s 
rousing dissent.”113 
On June 3, 1969, Nixon nominated Burger to serve as Chief Justice of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.114  Six days later, following a three-hour debate, the Senate 
confirmed Burger by a vote of seventy-four to three.115 
Three years later, Nixon further reshaped the Supreme Court, now the Burger 
Court, with the appointment of William Rehnquist as an Associate Justice.116  
Like Burger, Rehnquist was a strong and consistent opponent of the Miranda 
decision.117  When Nixon considered whether to name Rehnquist to the Court, 
he was surely mindful of a memorandum Rehnquist had prepared for the Nixon 
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Justice Department a few years earlier while Rehnquist was serving as an 
assistant attorney general in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel.118  In the 
memorandum, Rehnquist was critical of the Miranda decision, arguing, 
The past decade has witnessed a dramatic change in the interpretation 
given by the Supreme Court of the United States to the constitutional 
rights of criminal defendants.  Limitations both drastic and novel have 
been placed on the use by both the state and federal governments of 
pre-trial statements of the defendants . . . .119 
Elsewhere in the memorandum, Rehnquist wrote, 
The impact of Miranda and its progeny on the practices of law 
enforcement officials is far-reaching.  The Court is now committed to 
the proposition that relevant, competent, un-coerced statements of the 
defendant will not be admissible at his trial unless an elaborate set of 
warnings be given which is very likely to have the effect of preventing 
a defendant from making any statement at all.120 
The Burger Court, now fortified by Rehnquist—and later succeeded by the 
Rehnquist Court—had Miranda squarely in its sites.  Although many observers 
expected the newly constituted Court to overrule Miranda,121 it instead 
announced several decisions that preserved Miranda in name but undermined its 
constitutional status, thereby limiting its application and import.  In the first of 
these cases, Harris v. New York,122 the Court per Burger established an 
impeachment exception to Miranda, holding that a statement taken in violation 
of the Miranda warnings can be used to impeach the credibility of a defendant’s 
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defendants over the police by narrowing the scope of the original holding” in Miranda). 
 122. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
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direct testimony at trial.123  This result was directly at odds with Miranda itself, 
in which the Warren Court in dicta had rejected the idea of an impeachment 
exception.124  The Burger Court disagreed with this in Harris, reasoning that the 
costs of suppressing the defendant’s confession and thereby facilitating perjury 
outweighed the marginal benefits of suppression, which were limited to any 
additional deterrence of police misconduct that might be achieved by 
suppressing an unwarned statement for impeachment purposes.125  Harris 
clearly signaled that the Burger Court would evaluate the need for Miranda 
warnings in a new and less favorable fashion, one that was unabashedly 
utilitarian and not constitutionally based. 
Two years after Harris, the Court per Rehnquist, in Michigan v. Tucker,126 
announced that Miranda’s remedy of suppressing confessions did not always 
apply to derivative evidence, deeming admissible the testimony of a witness 
whose identity had been discovered as a result of questioning the defendant 
without providing him with a complete set of Miranda warnings.127  Later still, 
in New York v. Quarles,128 the Court per Rehnquist recognized a public safety 
exception to the Miranda warnings protocols.129  Finally, in Oregon v. Elstad,130 
in an opinion authored by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and joined by 
Rehnquist, the Court held that a statement made by a suspect after a proper 
recitation of Miranda warnings and a waiver thereof is normally admissible even 
when the suspect previously made an unwarned statement.131 
In these cases, and others, the Court exercised its authority to rewrite Miranda 
in the same manner to lawmakers who exercised their prerogative to amend 
legislation they had drafted earlier.  Recall that the Warren Court instructed, in 
Miranda and subsequent decisions, that the Miranda warnings were of 
constitutional dimension; that is, they originated with the Fifth Amendment.132  
The Burger Court disagreed that Miranda possessed such an elevated status.  
Rehnquist in particular redefined Miranda’s pedigree, calling the warnings 
                                                          
 123. Id. at 226.  Burger wrote the majority opinion in Harris, which was decided before Justice 
Rehnquist joined the Court the following year.  See id. at 222; see also Kamisar, supra note 10. 
 124. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 436, 476–77 (1966); see also supra note 77 and 
accompanying text.  With regard to Miranda’s comments about a possible impeachment exception, 
the Harris Court explained, “Some comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be read as 
indicating a bar to use of an uncounseled statement for any purpose, but discussion of that issue 
was not at all necessary to the Court’s holding and cannot be regarded as controlling.” Harris, 401 
U.S. at 224 (alteration in original). 
 125. Harris, 401 U.S. at 225–26. 
 126. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
 127. Id. at 450–52. 
 128. 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
 129. Id. at 655–56. 
 130. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
 131. Id. at 318. 
 132. See Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966); see also Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 
324, 326 (1969). 
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requirement a Court-created, prophylactic rule rather than a constitutional 
necessity.133  Rehnquist explained for the majority in Tucker that the Miranda 
warnings “were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were 
instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination 
was protected.”134  As the Court later instructed in Elstad, “The Miranda 
exclusionary rule . . . serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than 
the Fifth Amendment itself.  It may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth 
Amendment violation.”135 
Rehnquist’s reductionist characterization of Miranda had significant 
consequences.136  If the Court, rather than the Fifth Amendment, was now 
deemed to be the source of the need to administer Miranda warnings, then it 
follows that the Court had absolute authority to alter the contours of the Miranda 
requirements, diminish their significance, and subordinate their application.  It 
was Miranda’s lesser status as a Court-made directive that allowed Rehnquist to 
conclude in Quarles, for example, that a “concern for public safety must be 
paramount to adherence to the literal language of the prophylactic rules 
enunciated in Miranda.”137 
Congress launched a second front against Miranda shortly after the decision 
was announced.  The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968138 
was passed with overwhelming majorities in both houses.139  The legislation 
                                                          
 133. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994) (describing the Miranda warning as 
a “series of recommended ‘procedural safeguards’” (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 
443–44 (1974))); see also Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690 (1993) (highlighting that 
“Miranda’s safeguards are not constitutional in character”); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 
203 (1989) (instructing that “[t]he prophylactic Miranda warnings are ‘not themselves rights 
protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory 
self-incrimination [is] protected’” (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444)); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 
U.S. 523, 528 (1987) (explaining that “prohibition on further questioning—like other aspects of 
Miranda—is not itself required by the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on coerced confessions, but 
is instead justified only by reference to its prophylactic purpose”); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 
649, 654 (1984) (observing that it is well established that the Miranda warnings are “not themselves 
rights protected by the Constitution” (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444)); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 
298, 309 (1985) (referring to “prophylactic Miranda procedures”). 
 134. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444. 
 135. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306; accord Williams, 507 U.S. at 690–91. 
 136. The Rehnquist Court re-characterized Miranda in another important way.  Recall a basic 
premise of the Warren Court’s Miranda decision that compulsion was an inevitable attribute of 
custodial interrogation, and that rights warnings were needed to address this compulsion.  See 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.  The Rehnquist Court later concluded instead that a confession could be 
obtained in violation of the Miranda warnings requirement and nevertheless be voluntary.  See 
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314–15. 
 137. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 653. 
 138. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968). 
 139. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 
197, 239 (1968).  The Senate passed the bill by a vote of 72–4.  See RICHARD HARRIS, THE FEAR 
OF CRIME 98 (1969).  The House thereafter voted 317–60 against a conference and then 369–17 in 
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included a provision known as § 3501,140 which was designed to overrule 
Miranda and replace its warnings requirement with a case-by-case 
determination of voluntariness based on a totality-of-the-circumstances test.141  
Under § 3501, Miranda warnings would retain some relevance but would no 
longer be dispositive.142  Section 3501 essentially sought to return the criminal 
justice system to the pre-Miranda traditional involuntariness approach to 
confessions. 
The provision “was immediately seen as a bald Congressional attempt to rap 
the Supreme Court’s knuckles over crime.”143  Supporters of § 3501 countered 
that the legislation was needed to address “a direct connection between the 
enlargement of procedural requirements and a rising crime rate”144  Another 
plausible impetus for the legislation was that Congress assumed the bill, 
would inevitably reach the Supreme Court for constitutional 
adjudication [and thus it would] force the Supreme Court to re-
examine its holding in Miranda and possibly reverse that decision.  It 
is possible that this course was taken in anticipation of personnel 
changes on the Court which might alter the original five to four 
alignment of the Miranda Court.145 
Regardless of the underlying motivations for the legislation, the rhetoric by 
Senate proponents of § 3501, and thus opponents of Miranda, was passionate 
and sometimes vitriolic.146  For example, Senator John McClellan of Arkansas, 
                                                          
favor of accepting the Senate version in toto.  ADAM CARLYLE BRECKENRIDGE, CONGRESS 
AGAINST THE COURTS 94 (1970). 
 140. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968). 
 141. Id. § 3501(a)-(b).  On the issue of voluntariness, the trial judge can consider the following: 
(1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the 
confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment; (2) whether such defendant 
knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected 
at the time of making the confession; (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or 
knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could 
be used against him; (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to 
questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such 
defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such 
confession. 
Id. § 3501(b) (alteration in original). 
 142. Id. 
 143. FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 319 (1970). 
 144. OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR.  THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 141 (1973); 
see Inbau, supra note 77, at 1463–64 (urging the Court to modify its approach to confessions per 
Miranda so that it is consistent with § 3501). 
 145. Stephan, supra note 82, at 218 (alteration in original). 
 146. Besides the rhetoric of the senators themselves, 
An impressive list of law enforcement officers, district attorneys, and judges testified 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, alleging the deleterious effects of the Miranda 
and Mallory decisions and urging congressional action of a remedial nature.  The 
testimony was supplemented by scores of letters and newspaper clippings blaming 
Supreme Court decisions for the rising crime rate. 
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who chaired the Senate subcommittee hearings on the crime bill, said during the 
debate on the provision, 
[I]f this confessions provision is defeated, the law-breaker will be the 
beneficiary, and he will be further encouraged and reassured that he 
can continue a life of crime and depredations profitably with impunity 
and without punishment . . . . [If § 3501 is defeated,] every gangster 
and overlord of the underworld; . . . every murderer, rapist, robber . . . 
will have cause to rejoice and celebrate. 
Whereas, if it is defeated, the safety of decent people will be placed in 
greater jeopardy and every innocent, law-abiding . . . citizen in this 
land will have cause to weep and despair.147 
McClellan’s criticism of Miranda even extended to hyperbole about how the 
Miranda decision might someday intrude upon the sanctity of the American 
family: 
Under the Court’s logic in the Miranda case, the day may come when 
a parent cannot ask his child about any harm the child has committed 
upon his mother without the parent giving him a warning that anything 
the child says may be used against him.  Should fathers and mothers 
be required [to give the Miranda warnings] before they ask a child 
about an act that may be criminal . . . ?148 
Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina, a respected constitutional expert who 
later gained fame as Chairman of the Senate Watergate Committee,149 was 
likewise outspoken in his support for § 3501 and thus his opposition to Miranda.  
Ervin said, 
If you believe that the people of the United States should be ruled by 
a judicial oligarchy composed of five Supreme Court Justices rather 
than by the Constitution of the United States, you ought to vote against 
[the bill].  If you believe that self-confessed murderers, rapists, 
robbers, arsonists, burglars, and thieves ought to go unpunished, you 
ought to vote against [the bill] . . . . But if you believe . . . that enough 
                                                          
Id. at 216–17 (footnote omitted). 
 147. See 114 CONG. REC. 14,155 (1968) (alteration in original) (statement of Sen. McClellan).  
McClellan also argued: 
Today, why should a policeman go out and risk his life to catch a known murderer or 
criminal who is armed with a gun, when the Supreme Court will find some small 
technicality . . . to find a way to turn that murderer or criminal loose and then, [in its 
decisions] attack the officer who risked his life and reflect upon his integrity, by inferring 
that we cannot trust a policeman to do right . . . . That is their attitude. 
114 CONG. REC. 13,839 (1968) (alteration in original) (statement of Sen. McClellan). 
 148. 114 CONG. REC. 13,847 (1968) (alteration in original) (statement of Sen. McClellan).  Of 
course, McClellan’s rhetoric is misplaced.  The Fifth Amendment protects against Government 
misconduct.  It does not pertain to parent-child interactions. 
 149. See Revisiting Watergate, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/ 
onpolitics/watergate/sam.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2017) (briefly discussing Ervin’s role in the 
Senate Watergate Committee). 
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has been done for those who murder and rape and rob, and that 
something ought to be done for those who do not wish to be murdered 
or raped or robbed, then you should vote for [the bill].150 
Section 3501 was reluctantly signed into law by President Johnson before he 
departed office.151  The Justice Department, however, steadfastly refused to 
enforce or assert the provision through succeeding administrations, including the 
Nixon Administration that followed directly after Johnson’s.152  Because of the 
moratorium resulting from the Justice Department’s active and unwavering 
policy to avoid invoking § 3501,153 its constitutionality remained largely 
                                                          
 150. 114 CONG. REC. 14,155 (1968) (alteration in original) (statement of Sen. Ervin). 
 151. Max Frankel, President Signs Broad Crime Bill, With Objections, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 
1968, at 1.  Johnson was no fan of § 3501.  He signed the Crime Bill unenthusiastically, at the last 
hour, concluding that it contained “more good than [harm].”  Id. 
 152. See The Clinton Justice Department’s Refusal to Enforce the Law on Voluntary 
Confessions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 122 (1999).  The Department of Justice took the position that unless the 
Court overrules Miranda, “the United States is not free to urge the lower courts” to “rely on Section 
3501.” Id. (Memorandum from James K. Robinson, acting Assistant Attorney General in 1999).  
Also noted was that “[t]he Department has not yet decided whether it would ask the Supreme Court 
in an appropriate case to overrule or modify Miranda.”  Id. at 123 (Memorandum from John C. 
Keeney, acting Assistant Attorney General in 1997).  See also Eric D. Miller, Comment, Should 
Courts Consider 18 U.S.C. § 3501 Sua Sponte?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1029, 1034–35 (1998) (noting 
that Attorney General Ramsey Clark instructed U.S. Attorneys not to admit confessions into 
evidence unless they comported with Miranda); Andrew B. Loewenstein, Note, Judicial Review 
and the Limits of Prosecutorial Discretion, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 351, 357–62 (2001) (discussing 
the Justice Department’s refusal to enforce § 3501, and that under the Clinton administration, the 
Department of Justice remained steadfastly opposed to enforcing § 3501). 
 153. The principle reason § 3501 was untested in the courts is because the Justice Department 
went to great lengths to avoid invoking it.  As the Fourth Circuit noted, in the intervening years 
after Miranda was decided and before Dickerson, 
career federal prosecutors have tried to invoke § 3501 in [the Fourth Circuit] only to be 
overruled by the Department of Justice.  In March of 1997, for example, the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office in Alexandria, Virginia, appealed the suppression of a statement that 
the district court found was obtained in technical violation of Miranda.  See United States 
v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 1998).  In its brief, the U.S. Attorney’s Office urged 
this Court to reverse the district court on the basis of § 3501.  The Department of Justice, 
however, ordered the U.S. Attorney’s Office to withdraw its brief.  In its place, a brief 
without any reference to § 3501 was filed.  As a result, the Washington Legal Foundation 
and U.S. Senators Jeff Sessions, Jon Kyl, John Ashcroft, and Strom Thurmond, filed an 
amicus brief urging this Court to consider the admissibility of Sullivan’s confession 
under § 3501.  Because [the Fourth Circuit Court] ultimately concluded that Sullivan was 
not in custody for Miranda purposes when the incriminating statements were made, [it] 
had no occasion to address the applicability of § 3501. 
United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 682 (4th Cir. 1999) (alteration in original) (footnote 
omitted), rev’d, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).  The Justice Department similarly refused to invoke § 3501 
at the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
In United States v. Cheely, 21 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit suppressed an 
incriminating statement that was obtained in technical violation of Edwards.  Id. at 923.  
Although the Government did not petition for rehearing, the Ninth Circuit sua sponte 
asked the parties whether the case merited rehearing en banc.  See Cheely v. United 
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untested for decades before the courts,154 and it was never considered on the 
merits by the Supreme Court.155  Miranda, albeit weakened by the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts, still survived as the law of the land. 
It was not until 2000, in Dickerson v. United States,156 that § 3501 was fully 
and finally considered by the Supreme Court.  The district court in Dickerson 
suppressed the defendant’s statement because, although it was voluntary in the 
traditional sense, it was taken in violation of Miranda.157  This decision was 
reversed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that the defendant’s 
statement was admissible under § 3501.158  By affirming the constitutionality of 
                                                          
States, 92-30257 (9th Cir. May 25, 1994) (unpublished order).  Curiously, the Justice 
Department filed a memorandum opposing further review.  One week later, the Supreme 
Court in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), 
would bring § 3501 to the attention of the legal community.  In response, a career federal 
prosecutor sent a letter to the Ninth Circuit apprising them of the Court’s decision in 
Davis.  Later that same day, Solicitor General Drew Days withdrew the earlier letter and 
replaced it with a letter that downplayed the relevance of Davis to the issues at hand.  
Notwithstanding the letter from the Solicitor General, the Ninth Circuit “called for 
supplemental briefing from the parties as to the effect Davis might have on our 
conclusion” to suppress the statements in question.  United States v. Cheely, 36 F.3d 
1439, 1448 (9th Cir. 1994).  Although Justice filed a supplemental brief, it nevertheless 
failed to even argue the applicability of § 3501.  Upon reconsideration, the Ninth Circuit 
still suppressed the statement.  
Id. at 698 n.15. 
 154. See generally Paul G. Cassell, The Statue that Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the 
Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175, 217–18 (1999) (discussing the absence of judicial 
review of § 3501).  Indeed, federal courts of any kind had squarely dealt with § 3501 only twice 
before Dickerson was decided.  See United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129, 1138 (10th Cir. 1975) 
(holding that the trial court did not err when it applied § 3501 in concluding the defendant’s 
confession was voluntary); United States v. Rivas-Lopez, 988 F. Supp. 1424, 1435–36 (D. Utah 
1977) (holding that § 3501 is constitutional and thus its analysis is the proper standard to determine 
admissibility of defendants’ statements). 
 155. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 681.  Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion in Davis v. United 
States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), questioned whether the Department of Justice’s failure to invoke § 
3501 was “consistent with the Executive’s obligation to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.’”  Id. at 465 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
 156. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 157. Id. at 432.  The Fourth Circuit Court below reached the same conclusion that the 
defendant’s statement was voluntary.  See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 695 (“Although the district court 
specifically found that Dickerson’s confession was voluntary for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, 
it nevertheless suppressed the confession because it was obtained in technical violation of 
Miranda.”). 
 158. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 695.  The way in which the issue involving § 3501 was presented 
to and then addressed by the Fourth Circuit Court was rather convoluted.  At the district court 
below, the government did not assert § 3501 as a basis for admitting Dickerson’s confession.  Id. 
at 672.  When the government lost at the district court (in a memorandum opinion) and the 
confession was suppressed, it requested reconsideration by the district court, this time asserting 
compliance with § 3501 as a basis for reconsideration.  Id. at 675–76.  The district court denied the 
motion for reconsideration.  See United States v. Dickerson, 971 F. Supp. 1023, 1023 (E.D. Va. 
1997).  The government then appealed the district court’s decision to the Fourth Circuit.  Dickerson, 
166 F.3d at 677.  Section 3501 was not, however, briefed by the government at the Fourth Circuit 
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§ 3501, the Fourth Circuit necessarily concluded that Congress had the authority 
to overrule Miranda and restore the traditional voluntariness test.159  As the 
Fourth Circuit explained in its Dickerson decision, 
Congress, pursuant to its power to establish the rules of evidence and 
procedure in the federal courts, acted well within its authority in 
enacting § 3501.  As a consequence, § 3501, rather than Miranda, 
governs the admissibility of confessions in federal court.160 
The Fourth Circuit noted in Dickerson that Miranda retained some 
significance under § 3501. 
Congress did not completely abandon the central holding of Miranda, 
i.e., the four warnings are important safeguards in protecting the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  Indeed, § 3501 
specifically lists the Miranda warnings as factors that a district court 
should consider when determining whether a confession was 
voluntarily given.161 
The Miranda decision, in the words of former Supreme Court Justice Arthur 
Goldberg, now found itself “twisting slowly in the wind.”162  At last, the stage 
was fully set for the Rehnquist Court to pass judgment on Miranda’s continued 
viability. 
IV.  MIRANDA SURVIVES 
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Dickerson in 1999,163 it seemed 
as if Miranda’s day of reckoning would soon arrive.  In the words of Professor 
Donald Dripps, 
Once the Court granted [certiorari in Dickerson], court-watchers knew 
the hour had come.  At long last the Court would have to either 
repudiate Miranda, repudiate the prophylactic-rule cases, or offer 
some ingenious reconciliation of the two lines of precedent.164 
                                                          
as a basis for reversal.  Judge Karen Williams, writing for the two-judge majority at the Fourth 
Circuit, considered § 3501 sua sponte, explaining that the government’s decision to forego invoking 
§ 3501 did not prevent the court from addressing the constitutionality of the statute.  Id. at 683; see 
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976) (stating that the issues to be determined are within 
the discretion of the courts of appeals).  See generally Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 421–
23 (1996) (discussing the extent to which the district courts have the power to act sua sponte). 
 159. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 671. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 686–87. 
 162. See Arthur J. Goldberg, Escobedo and Miranda Revisited, 18 AKRON L. REV. 177, 182 
(1985). 
 163. Dickerson v. United States, 528 U.S. 1045 (1999). 
 164. See Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, 
Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-But-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 33 (2001) 
(alteration in original). 
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Many predicted Miranda’s demise because of all that had happened over the 
previous thirty-five years since it was decided.165  The 5–4 Supreme Court 
decision in Miranda was widely unpopular.  Congress had swiftly and 
overwhelmingly passed § 3501, which overruled Miranda.166  The legislation 
was signed by the President and upheld by the Fourth Circuit.  Years later, when 
the statute finally reached the Supreme Court for its consideration, that Court 
had been significantly reconstituted as a more conservative body led by a Chief 
Justice who was a longtime critic of Miranda.167  Indeed, the fate of § 3501, and, 
thus, Miranda would be decided by a majority of Justices who joined together 
in a multi-decade project of diminishing Miranda’s status and influence.  It was 
the perfect storm.  All three branches of government and the public seemed 
aligned against Miranda, and all the pieces were now in place for the Court to 
deliver the coup de grace.168 
But a funny thing happened on the way to the guillotine.  The Supreme Court 
in Dickerson instead struck down § 3501 and thereby ensured Miranda’s 
continued vitality.169  More surprisingly, it did so by an overwhelming 7–2 
vote.170  Most surprisingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority 
opinion.171 
Rehnquist explained the Court’s rationale in Dickerson as follows: 
In Miranda v. Arizona, we held that certain warnings must be given 
before a suspect’s statement made during custodial interrogation could 
be admitted in evidence.  In the wake of that decision, Congress 
enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which in essence laid down a rule that the 
                                                          
 165. See GARY L. STUART, MIRANDA: THE STORY OF AMERICA’S RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT 
167–68 (2004) (noting that before Dickerson, many thought the Court would overrule Miranda). 
 166. Lucian Paul Sbarra, Note, Wiping the Dust Off of an Old Statute: United States v. 
Dickerson Eliminates the Miranda Warnings, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 481, 481–82 (2000). 
 167. See Dripps, supra note 164, at 3. 
 168. See Sbarra, supra note 166, at 497 (contending that “the interplay between the Department 
of Justice’s repeated failure to § 3501 and the Supreme Court’s limits on the Miranda rule provided 
the fuel for the Dickerson court to pronounce § 3501 as constitutional and to eradicate the necessity 
for the Miranda warnings”).  On the other hand, some commentators were optimistic that Miranda 
would survive Dickerson.  See STUART, supra note 165, at 112–14. 
 169. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). 
 170. Id. at 430. 
 171. Id. at 431.  The oral argument at the Supreme Court in the Dickerson case was somewhat 
irregular.  Of course, counsel representing Dickerson did not argue in support of § 3501.  Consistent 
with its past policies, the Justice Department likewise did not defend the constitutionality of the 
statute.  Accordingly, the Court appointed Professor Paul Cassell to serve as an amicus and argue 
in defense of § 3501.  Cassell, a former Rehnquist clerk, was no doubt selected for this task because 
he was a prominent and longtime critic of Miranda.  See generally Paul G. Cassell & Richard 
Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law 
Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1058–59 (1998); Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: 
 The Grand Illusion of Miranda’s Defenders, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1084, 1085 (1996); Paul G. Cassell, 
Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 390 (1996) 
[hereinafter Cassell I]. 
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admissibility of such statements should turn only on whether or not 
they were voluntarily made.  We hold that Miranda, being a 
constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by 
an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves.  
We therefore hold that Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern 
the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in 
both state and federal courts.172 
Regardless of whether one approves of the result in Dickerson, there is general 
agreement that Rehnquist’s majority opinion was tepid and uninspiring.  The 
criticism is fair, as his opinion reads more like a compromise report of a divided 
committee than the principled expression of a scholarly jurist.173  Professor Paul 
Cassell called Rehnquist’s opinion in Dickerson “skimpy” and “jerry-built.”174  
Professor Yale Kamisar described it as “rather flat.”175  Professor Susan Klein 
said the opinion was “in a word, terrible.”176  Professor Donald Dripps 
complained it was “intentionally written to say less rather than more.”177  
Critiques aside, however, the more remarkable feature of Rehnquist’s opinion in 
Dickerson is not its lackluster quality but rather its surprising result, that is, 
Miranda’s reprieve. 
The question begs to be asked: why would “Rehnquist, for decades an 
implacable critic of Miranda,”178 ride to its rescue in Dickerson?  The most 
widely accepted, albeit speculative, explanation is that because Rehnquist did 
not have the votes to overrule Miranda, he decided to join the majority and 
minimize damage.179  The theory goes like this: if Rehnquist had stayed true to 
his beliefs and instead voted with the dissenting Justices in Dickerson, Justice 
John Paul Stevens, perhaps the strongest proponent of Miranda who was then 
on the Court, would have likely written the majority opinion.180  Fearing this, 
Rehnquist joined the pro-Miranda majority in Dickerson so he could assign the 
case to himself and thus block Stevens from attempting to resurrect Miranda to 
the elevated status it had enjoyed under the Warren Court.181  In particular, 
                                                          
 172. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431–32 (citation omitted). 
 173. See id. at 438–39. 
 174. Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court’s Failures in Dickerson, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 898, 902 (2001) [hereinafter Cassell II]. 
 175. Kamisar II, supra note 69, at 893. 
 176. Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and 
Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1071 (2001). 
 177. Dripps, supra note 164, at 3. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See STUART, supra note 165, at 122–23. 
 180. When the Chief Justice dissents, the writing of the majority opinion is assigned by the 
Senior Justice among those voting in the majority.  See Supreme Court Procedures, UNITED 
STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-
educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1 (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).  In the case of 
Dickerson, this would have been Stevens. 
 181. See STUART, supra note 165, at 122–23. 
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Rehnquist could have been concerned that if Stevens used Dickerson to re-
establish Miranda’s constitutional standing, this would set the stage for the 
Court in the future to undo the various exceptions and limitations to Miranda 
instituted over the years under Burger’s and Rehnquist’s leadership.  Consistent 
with this reasoning, if the split among the Justices had instead been 4–4, rather 
than 6–2, in opposition to § 3501, Rehnquist would have joined the other side 
and authored an opinion striking down Miranda.  Because Rehnquist did not 
have the votes needed to overrule Miranda, he opted instead to join the majority 
and preserve a diminished Miranda rather than voting with the dissent and 
thereby risking the resuscitation of an invigorated Miranda. 
There are other possible, albeit speculative, explanations for Rehnquist’s 
actions in Dickerson.  Rehnquist could have regarded Dickerson as an 
opportunity for the Court to assert and maintain its power vis-à-vis Congress, 
which made no secret of its intent to overrule Miranda through § 3501.  
Professor Craig Bradley, a former Rehnquist clerk, wrote about Dickerson, “for 
the Supreme Court to overrule Miranda itself is one thing, to stand by while 
Congress does this is quite another.  In Dickerson, the majority, which included 
O’Connor, sent a strong message to Congress: Stay off our turf!”182 
Professors Michael Dorf and Barry Friedman were just as emphatic when 
proposing the explanation that, 
[Section 3501] was a slap at the Court, and if any Court was likely to 
slap back, it was [the Dickerson Court].  For the Court that in recent 
years has given us [various decisions] favoring its own power at the 
expense of Congress, [§] 3501 was a gnat that ran into the windshield 
of whatever it was that Miranda held.183 
This theory may also explain the surprising consensus of opinion reflected in 
an overwhelming 7–2 vote in Dickerson without any concurring opinions.  It 
could well be that Rehnquist and most of his colleagues endeavored to form as 
united a front as possible because they were directly confronting Congress by 
striking down § 3501.  There is precedent for the Court seeking broad internal 
consensus when opposing a co-equal branch of the government.  In Nixon v. 
United States,184 for example, the Court found itself in an adversarial posture 
vis-à-vis the President in deciding whether the “Watergate tapes” were 
privileged.185  There, the Court decided the issue against the President’s interests 
                                                          
 182. See Craig Bradley, Supreme Court Review Behind the Dickerson Decision, TRIAL, Oct. 
2000, at 80. 
 183. Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. 
REV. 61, 72 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). 
 184. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).  In Nixon, the Court held that tapes of Nixon’s conversations were 
not privileged and had to be released, concluding that there is no “absolute, unqualified Presidential 
privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.”  Id. at 706.  Ironically, it was 
Burger who delivered the Court’s unanimous opinion in Nixon, joined by among others Justices 
Blackman and Powell, who were also Nixon appointees. 
 185. Id. at 687–90. 
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by an 8–0 vote.186  It has been widely reported that the Justices worked together 
to arrive at a unanimous decision as Nixon had earlier said that he would comply 
with a “definitive order” by the Court, which, some speculated, signaled he 
might defy a split decision.187  In Dickerson, Rehnquist and six other Justices 
may have likewise joined together to forge a united front when asserting the 
Court’s authority over Congress on matters of constitutional interpretation and 
application.188 
Closely related to the imperative to defend the Court’s turf could have been 
Rehnquist’s desire to assume a strong leadership role as the Chief Justice.  
Rehnquist could advance this objective by assembling a decisive majority in 
Dickerson, even if this meant authoring an uninspired consensus opinion that 
required him to subordinate his personal views that he had more freely expressed 
as an Associate Justice.189  This reasoning may help explain the 7–2 vote to strike 
down the statute without any concurring or separate opinions.  Rehnquist may 
have persuaded Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy, 
seemingly the swing votes in Dickerson,190 to join a compromise opinion 
preserving a diminished Miranda without writing separately in exchange for 
Stevens, an enthusiastic supporter of Miranda, to do the same.  Justice Antonin 
Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, delivered a broadside dissent in 
Dickerson that most observers agree scored points at the majority’s expense.191  
However, Rehnquist’s opinion barely acknowledges, let alone fully addresses, 
Scalia’s dissent.  The absence of a forceful response to the dissenting Justices 
could reflect that Rehnquist was less concerned about engaging issues and 
garnering scholarly approval than he was about forming and leading a unified 
seven-Justice majority.192 
                                                          
 186. Id. at 707; see STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF 
RICHARD NIXON 508 (1990) (explaining that Rehnquist, then an Associate Justice, recused himself 
from the case because of his past association with the Nixon administration). 
 187. Bruce Kauffman, The United States v. Nixon: A Unanimous Supreme Court Decision, 
HISTORY LESSONS (Jul. 28, 2012), http://historylessons.net/the-united-states-v-nixon-a-unanimous 
-supreme-court-decision (observing that “before the trial began[,] Nixon had said he would abide 
by ‘a definitive order’ by the [C]ourt, which most [J]ustices took to mean that if they produced a 
split decision, Nixon might defy the ruling.  Therefore, even though the [J]ustices were divided on 
many issues, they voted unanimously to impress upon Nixon that the [C]ourt must be obeyed.”). 
 188. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000).  Years earlier under Warren’s 
leadership, the Court worked together to forge a unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding unconstitutional state laws establishing separate 
public schools for black and white students).  Unanimity was assigned great importance by the 
Court in Brown, as it anticipated resistance to court-ordered desegregation, especially in some of 
the Southern states.  See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 798–803 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 189. See Cassell II, supra note 174, at 900. 
 190. See Dripps, supra note 164, at 62. 
 191. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444–65 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Dorf & Friedman, supra note 
183, at 69–70. 
 192. In the words of Professor Dripps, 
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Also, Rehnquist and the Dickerson majority may have preserved a diminished 
Miranda because of a fear of the unknown.  If the Court had instead affirmed § 
3501 and thereby struck down Miranda, this would have essentially re-
established the traditional involuntariness test for the admissibility of 
confessions, at least in federal trials.  This, in turn, would have reignited the 
same complaints about the old involuntariness approach, including that it failed 
to provide adequate standards and was largely ineffective in protecting suspects 
against excesses by the police.  Moreover, states would not have to follow suit 
and could instead establish their own requirements for custodial interrogation as 
long as they provided at least as much protection as afforded by the Fifth 
Amendment as implemented via § 3501.193  While some states would surely 
adopt an approach that replicated § 3501, others would likely opt to retain the 
Miranda warnings requirements194 or establish different standards.  The result 
would be an undesirable and complicated hodgepodge of rules and protections 
that would vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
Beyond all of this, it is uncertain how a pre-Miranda approach to custodial 
interrogation would actually be applied to 21st Century America in which public 
acceptance of the Miranda warning requirements has dramatically grown; 
police, prosecutors, and defense counsel have for decades adjusted their 
procedures and structured their roles to account for Miranda and its 
                                                          
The fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist, for decades an implacable critic of Miranda, wrote 
the majority opinion, is more than one of those rich ironies with which our constitutional 
history abounds.  It is also a sure sign of a compromise opinion, intentionally written to 
say less rather than more, for the sake of achieving a strong majority on the narrow 
question of Miranda’s continued vitality. 
Dripps, supra note 164, at 3. 
 193. See, e.g., State v. Knapp, 666 N.W.2d 881, 897 (Wis. 2003) (holding that physical 
evidence obtained as a direct result of an intentional violation of Miranda warnings is deemed to 
be inadmissible under Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution, even though such evidence 
would be admissible under United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004)); see generally Brigham 
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 409 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that “[f]ederal interests 
are not offended when a single State elects to provide greater protection for its citizens than the 
Federal Constitution requires”); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 489 (1977) (discussing how state constitutions can afford 
greater protection of individual rights than the Federal Constitution). 
 194. The states would be free to retain the Miranda warnings and waiver requirements as a 
matter of state law, either via the state constitution or state statute.  For example, in Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Court adopted for the federal system a broad, totality-of-the-circumstances 
analysis for evaluating the reliability of information provided by an informant.  Id. at 214.  Gates 
replaced the more rigorous approach required by Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and 
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).  Gates, 462 U.S. at 238–39.  Although fourty-five 
states and the District of Columbia have adopted the Gates approach, six states continue to adhere 
to the prior and more rigorous standards provided by Aguilar and Spinelli.  See Sean C. Monaghan, 
Gates v. Aguilar-Spinelli Test, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES, & EXECUTIVE 
MATERIALS, http://users.wfu.edu/wrightrf/Aspen-Students/statesurveys_aguilarspinelli.htm (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2017). 
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requirements.195  Recall that opinion polls taken before and shortly after the 
Miranda decision reflected that the public strongly opposed Miranda, and the 
Court’s role in establishing warning requirements.196  Years later, in a later poll 
taken shortly after the Dickerson decision, an overwhelming ninety-four percent 
of Americans said the police should inform suspects of their constitutional rights 
before questioning them.197  Over time, the public came to endorse Miranda. 
Finally, there is no doubt Miranda had some beneficial effect of curbing 
excesses by the police when seeking confessions from criminal suspects.  If the 
Miranda warnings were no longer required, the Court may have feared that 
police might backslide.  And, because Miranda became so widely known and 
deeply engrained in the broader culture, many criminal suspects subjected to 
custodial interrogation would no doubt ask police about their “Miranda rights” 
even if Miranda had been overruled.198  How should the police properly respond 
to these questions in a post-Miranda world?  Rehnquist and other Justices may 
have reasoned that if the Court is going to overrule the most famous criminal 
procedure case in American history, it should at least be relatively confident 
Miranda would be replaced by a uniform approach for interrogating suspects 
that is readily capable of a prompt, effective, and uncomplicated implementation 
and use.  Perhaps the Court declined to overrule Miranda for no other reason but 
for the doubt that these objectives could be painlessly accomplished and the 
uncertainty of the unintended consequences that would follow its demise. 
                                                          
 195. My guess is that some states would retain the requirement for Miranda warnings or an 
equivalent approach via legislation or rules of criminal procedure.  Regardless, it is likely that most 
jurisdictions and police departments would routinely continue to administer Miranda warnings as 
a matter of practice and procedure.  As noted later in this article, over the years, police have 
successfully adjusted to Miranda and the warnings requirements without measurably reducing the 
likelihood of obtaining a confession.  See infra notes 208–212, and accompanying text.  In most 
cases under § 3501, prosecutors would likely resort to a totality-of-the-circumstances test for 
admissibility of a confession only when there was a defect or omission of the Miranda warnings.  
On the other hand, a minority of jurisdictions would probably dispense with Miranda warnings and 
return to pre-Miranda interrogation practices, at least initially, but some of these may later return 
to administering the warnings if confessions were being suppressed by judges at a higher rate. 
 196. Bruce Peabody, Fifty Years Later, the Miranda Decision Hasn’t Accomplished What the 
Supreme Court Intended, WASH. POST (June 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/13/your-miranda-rights-are-50-years-old-today-heres-how-that-
decision-has-aged/?wpisrc=nl_politics&wpmm=1. 
 197. Supreme Court’s Miranda Decision, GALLUP (June 27, 2000), http://www.gallup.com/ 
poll/2779/supreme-courts-miranda-decision.aspx.  At the same time, the public was about evenly 
divided over whether confessions obtained without informing defendants of their rights should be 
admissible in trial, with forty-five percent saying they should be while forty-nine percent 
responding that they should not be.  Id. 
 198. See id. 
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V.  MIRANDA’S NEXT FIFTY YEARS 
Any hopes that Dickerson signaled the rebirth of an invigorated Miranda were 
quickly dashed.  In United States v. Patane,199 decided in 2004, a detective 
questioned a suspect about a pistol he allegedly possessed without first 
complying with the Miranda warnings and waiver requirements.200  The suspect 
told the detective where to find the pistol, which the detective then seized.201  
Relying heavily on pre-Dickerson cases, the Court barred the use of the 
statement itself but allowed the pistol to be introduced into evidence.202  A 
majority of the Court, including Rehnquist, seemed to attach no significance to 
the fact that Dickerson, per Rehnquist, stated a few years earlier that Miranda 
“announc[ed] a constitutional rule.”203  Patane makes clear that although 
Dickerson preserved Miranda, it did so in its pre-Dickerson, diminished form. 
The Miranda we know today—that is, the post-Dickerson and post-Patane 
version of it—is far different than the Miranda of fifty years ago.  In its early 
years, Miranda was countercultural and destabilizing.204  Over time, it became 
mainstream.  This ossification is not unlike that experienced by a long-haired 
rock star from the 1960s whom parents despised, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) fined, and overflowing stadium crowds cheered.  Decades 
later, we find that the same rock icon, now worn and battle-scarred, enjoys a 
high Q rating, appears in nostalgic minivan commercials, and headlines county 
fairs.  Miranda, like a middle-aged former rock star, has entered into its sedate, 
golden years. 
                                                          
 199. 542 U.S. 630 (2004). 
 200. Id. at 635. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 633.  The Court specifically instructed that “nothing in Dickerson, including its 
characterization of Miranda as announcing a constitutional rule, changes” any of the prior 
limitations or exceptions to the warning requirements.  Id. at 640 (citation omitted). 
 203. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440 (2000) (alteration in original). 
 204. See Stephan, supra note 82, at 217–18; see also Kamisar III, supra note 84, at 894–95. 
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Indeed, Miranda has become universally accepted and even preferred.205  
Police have become comfortable with the need to provide Miranda warnings.206  
By now all active law enforcement officers have grown up exclusively with 
Miranda and have been trained to comply with its requirements.207  Miranda is 
comparatively easy for police to follow.  It provides clear guidance to law 
enforcement for securing a rights waiver and imposes no other serious 
impediments upon their efforts to obtain confessions.208  Since Dickerson, the 
Court has seriously rebuked the police in Miranda’s name only once, when they 
deliberately sought to exploit the required warnings through a carefully planned 
process so as to undermine Fifth Amendment protections.209  Although Miranda 
imposes some absolute requirements upon the police, these are clearly defined 
and can be readily satisfied with little difficulty.210  After decades of practice 
                                                          
 205. This is not to suggest that the substantive criticism of the Miranda decision has been 
convincingly addressed or universally rejected.  But although many of these critiques remain 
relevant, they are no longer regularly voiced.  See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in 
Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2667–69, 2672 (1994); 
see also Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH L. REV. 1086, 1086 (1994) (arguing that Miranda lacks both 
historical and textual support); Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 
1433–35, 1441–43 (1985) (arguing that (a) the traditional involuntary test was adequate and thus 
the Miranda protocols were unnecessary and irrational, and (b) that Miranda is anti-confession and 
misguidedly seeks to level the playing field between criminal suspects and the police); Paul G. 
Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of 
Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 871–72 (1996); Richard H. Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., 
Miranda in Pittsburgh—A Statistical Study, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 26 (1967) (arguing, with the 
support of data, that Miranda is injurious to law enforcement); Cassell I, supra note 171, at 418, 
438–40; Milhizer, supra note 58, at 39–48 (arguing that Miranda’s reliance on psychological theory 
to justify the need for rights warnings is problematic.); Eugene R. Milhizer, Confessions After 
Connelly: An Evidentiary Solution for Excluding Unreliable Confessions, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 27 
(2008) (arguing that “Miranda represents a veritable triumph of quasi voluntariness over reliability, 
i.e., not the voluntariness of a confession itself but rather the voluntariness of the Miranda waiver 
that permits custodial interrogation that can lead to a confession”); YALE KAMISAR, POLICE 
INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 86–87 (1980) (observing that 
“a cogent criticism of the old ‘voluntariness’ test also applies to Miranda,” i.e., that because the 
critical events occur in secrecy the admissibility of the confession will be determined by the 
outcome of a “swearing contest” in court). 
 206. Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1011–12 (2001). 
 207. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 434 (1984). 
 208. See Leo, supra note 206, at 1015; see also Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure to Restrain 
Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1213, 1217, 1246 (2001) (noting that 
Miranda imposes few, if any, meaningful restraints on post-waiver police interrogation methods). 
 209. See, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616–18 (2004) (holding that if the deliberate 
two-step strategy (i.e., obtaining a second confession after Miranda warnings as a continuation of 
a previously unwarned confession) has been used, post-warning statements that are related to the 
substance of pre-warning statements must be excluded unless curative measures are taken before 
the post-warning statement is made). 
 210. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and 
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 510 (1996) [hereinafter Schulhofer]; see 
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honed by trial and error, the police have expertly incorporated Miranda warnings 
into their interrogation procedures without unduly compromising their ultimate 
objective of obtaining admissible confessions.211  The Miranda decision has 
even been praised by law enforcement authorities because it has “provided an 
opportunity to professionalize the police.”212 
Prosecutors have come to like Miranda.  When the police have obtained a 
waiver of Miranda rights, as they frequently do,213 the corresponding confession 
is almost always bulletproof from defense attack.  Miranda can be said “to 
liberate the police,”214 and thus help prosecutors because compliance with the 
warnings protocols substantially reduces the likelihood that a court will conclude 
that the interrogation process was coercive under the traditional involuntariness 
approach.215  A properly executed and signed Miranda rights waiver certificate 
is, for all practical purposes, often the beginning and the end of a motion to 
suppress a confession.216  Over time, Miranda has become as much a sword for 
the prosecution as it is a shield for criminal suspects.217 
Of course, defense counsel also support Miranda.  Even with all of its faults 
and shortcomings, the Miranda warning requirements provide superior 
protection to criminal suspects as compared to the traditional voluntariness 
                                                          
also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 456–57 (1987) 
[hereinafter Schulhofer I] (arguing that Miranda has had little impact on law enforcement’s ability 
to obtain confessions).  Further, as the forensic sciences have advanced, the need for confessions 
to obtain convictions has correspondingly diminished. 
 211. See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN & MARY L. PITMAN, THE MIRANDA RULING: ITS PAST, 
PRESENT, AND FUTURE 139–41, 144, 147–50 (2010) (observing that police have an extensive 
repertoire of ploys to cause suspects to confess, including flattery and ingratiation, veiled threats, 
and deception.). 
 212. See Yale Kamisar, Landmark Ruling’s Had No Detrimental Effect, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 
1, 1987, at A27, as quoted in Schulhofer I, supra note 210, at 458 n.59; see also Richard A. Leo, 
Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 268 nn. 13–15, 272 (1996) 
(finding, based on the observation of 122 interrogations and examination of 60 videotapes of 
interrogations in police departments operating in three urban areas with populations ranging from 
about 116,000 to 372,000, that approximately 78% of suspects waived their Miranda rights); see 
also Cassell & Hayman, supra note 205, at 859–60 (concluding, based on the examination of 129 
interrogations conducted with Salt Lake County, Utah, that approximately 84% of suspects waived 
their Miranda rights). 
 213. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 205, at 859 (noting that 83.7% of suspects waive their 
Miranda rights). 
 214. Schulhofer I, supra note 210, at 454. 
 215. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984) (“[C]ases in which a defendant 
can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact 
that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.”). 
 216. See McCarty, 468 U.S. at 430. 
 217. See STUART, supra note 165, at 101 (observing that “as of 1988, less than 1 percent of all 
American criminal cases had been dismissed because of ‘unwarned’ confessions.  And only a 
fraction of that 1 percent was dismissed for noncompliance with Miranda.”); see also Schulhofer, 
supra note 210, at 502 (explaining that “[f]or all practical purposes, Miranda’s empirically 
detectable harm to law enforcement shrinks virtually to zero”). 
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approach.218  The obligation to give Miranda warnings and obtain a waiver can 
curb many possible police excesses, and it allows for the systematic involvement 
of defense counsel during the investigatory stage of trial. 
For all these reasons, Miranda’s next fifty years thus seem far more secure 
than its first five decades.  No organized or motivated anti-Miranda constituency 
still exists.  Miranda is no longer polarizing, threatening, counter-cultural, or 
extreme.  It has instead become an unassuming fact of life that imposes only 
modest requirements on law enforcement, which are easily and routinely 
satisfied.  As Professor Leo put it, “Once feared to be the equivalent of sand in 
the machinery of criminal justice, Miranda has now become a standard part of 
the machine.”219 
This is the final and perhaps greatest irony of Miranda’s circuitous legal and 
political journey.  When Miranda burst onto the scene, it was revolutionary and 
destabilizing.  It was bold and threatening.  In its original form, it was too big to 
succeed.  Fifty years later, after being relentlessly eroded and diminished, 
Miranda has become widely accepted,220 rather innocuous and seemingly 













                                                          
 218. See STUART, supra note 165, at 103–04. 
 219. See Leo, supra note 206, at 1027. 
 220. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 221. There is likewise a final irony in the personal story of Ernesto Miranda.  After being 
released on parole for his last criminal convictions, Miranda frequented a seedy area of Phoenix 
known as the Deuce section.  In a bar located in Deuce section on the evening of January 31, 1976, 
Miranda was involved in a dispute about cheating during a card game.  The argument turned violent 
and ended when one of the card players stabbed Miranda to death.  Although the perpetrator evaded 
the police, his alleged accomplice was arrested and taken to the stationhouse for questioning.  As 
was now required by the Supreme Court, the officers first advised the suspect of his Miranda 
warnings.  The suspect declined to waive his rights and answer questions, and therefore was 
ultimately released because of a lack of evidence.  See BAKER, supra note 19, at 408–09.  It thus 
seems quite likely that those responsible for Miranda’s death avoided conviction because of the 
protections afforded to them by the rights warning and waiver protocols bearing their victim’s 
name. 
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